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Commodity agreements have been discussed for many years. However, only two agreements 
(for cocoa and rubber) have been concluded that do not rule out success in advance. Using 
an annual model of the cocoa market, the viability of the instruments agreed upon is ana- 
lyzed, and ways and means to improve the functioning of commodity agreements are ex- 
plored. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
International commodity agreements that aim for welfare im- 
provement through revenue stabilization are still a  major policy 
issue of UNCTAD. Revenue stabilization through price stabiliza- 
tion has been an important research issue in the economic literature 
for a  long time also.  In the literature two types of stabilization 
policies are distinguished. The first one is a band width rule or price 
range. The price range has as a  disadvantage that it restricts the 
price variation to a prespecified range, and does normally not take 
into account effects that force the price out of the range. The second 
type is a price adjustment rule, which means that the buffer stock 
manager keeps the price as close as possible to a prespecified long 
term reference or target price path. This kind of rule results from 
an optimal control formulation of the problem. 
Starting point for much of the theoretical analysis is the Waugh- 
Oi-Massell model, in which the arithmetic mean of the price can 
be used as reference price. This model has been extended in many 
directions. The main conclusion is that an overall welfare gain can 
be achieved by stabilizing prices through buffer stock operations, 
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and that the net gain per country increases with domestic variance 
in disturbances and decreases with foreign disturbances (Devadoss, 
1992). Devadoss shows also that in a linear world with distortionary 
interventions in producing and consuming countries, causing greater 
world price variation, international price stabilization leads to over- 
all welfare gains also. He restricts his analysis to linear models with 
additive disturbances, because the introduction of nonlinearities 
in demand and supply in a multicountry model with multiplicative 
disturbances prohibits definite inference. 
If the analysis is extended to nonlinear models with multiplicative 
random disturbance terms, conclusions on who is going to benefit 
are less straightforward, but the gain for the world remains positive 
(Turnovsky,  1976;  Schmits,  1984).  Turnovsky (1976,  1978)  also 
shows that in a nonlinear model with multiplicative disturbances, 
the issue of demand and/or  supply induced disturbances is less 
relevant. He concludes that in general the stabilized price at which 
the buffer  stock is  self-liquidating (its  expected size will remain 
constant over time) is not the arithmetic mean. Nguyen (1979, 1980) 
showed that in case of a linear model formulated in growth rates 
the geometric mean rather than the arithmetic mean should be used 
as reference path for price stabilization. 
Lee and Blandford (1980) perform an optimal control analysis 
for price and revenue stabilization. They stress the need to take 
account of the systematic trend of the price-setting target rice path, 
because otherwise the stabilization attempts  are doomed to fail. 
They conclude that substantial market intervention is required for 
a significant reduction in price instability. Ghosh, Gilbert, and Hughes 
Hallett (1982,  1987),  and Hughes Hallett (1986) explore the same 
problem, but with the market-clearing identity replaced by an ex- 
plicit price formation mechanism. Their conclusion is that market 
stabilization is possible, but very expensive. There is substantial 
earnings stabilization, but in contrast to Lee and Blandford there 
is no improvement in the level of earnings. 
The optimal control solution has to be replaced by a difference 
game if producing and consuming countries are still strategically 
active on the international market, although they coordinate their 
stabilizing efforts through a buffer stock manager (Van Groenen- 
daal and de Zeeuw, 1991). They conclude that the stabilizing efforts 
are partly offset by the strategic activities, but some of the market 
participants are still better off. Also Turnovsky (1978) and New- 
berry and Stiglitz (1982) analyze whether the actions of speculators 
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authority. Newberry and Stiglitz (1981) argue that the benefits from 
price stabilization will be small compared to the costs of operating 
the buffer stock; the benefits are not necessarily distributed in favor 
of the producers. The market for primary commodities  is competi- 
tive and complete, because future and risk markets are redundant. 
This implies that the market equilibrium is Pareto efficient, so that 
the optimal stabilizing policy only reproduces the storage decisions 
of risk-neutral competitive  speculators with rational price forecasts 
(Newberry and Stiglitz,  1982). 
Note that no definite conclusions with respect to the effect of 
price and earnings stabilization through buffer stock operations in 
a realistic  setting can be drawn from any of the different types of 
theoretical analysis. 
How about the agreements concluded upon in the past? As was 
shown by Anderson and Gilbert  (1988), five consecutive tin agree- 
ments lasted for over 40 years, before the sixth agreement collapsed 
because "it degenerated into an arrangement for the defence of a 
non-competitive  price floor." The tin disaster and the absence of 
other long-term effective buffer stock agreements seem to confirm 
the pessimistic view that many theorists have about the usefulness 
of buffer stock agreements. The main lesson for buffer stock policy 
implementation  should, however, not be that buffer stock agreements 
do not work, but that buffer stock intervention  should not go against 
the general tendency  of the market or, more precisely, the structural 
development in market prices. The agreements drafted before the 
tin disaster were in that respect not flexible enough. Incorporating 
this lesson into a commodity agreement means that the decision 
rule for selling out of or buying for the buffer stock should not 
try to alter the market price trend determined by supply and de- 
mand, and should not ignore changes in prices induced by factors 
from outside the market (spillover effects). 
We can conclude  that the theoretical  and the practical evidence  on 
buffer stock agreements is if not contradictive at least inconclusive. 
Therefore it is worthwhile to search for heuristic buffer stock rules 
that are robust in a realistic setting, and that fulfill two require- 
ments: (1) the rule should stabilize long term export earnings at a 
reasonable cost, and (2) the buffer stock has to be self-liquidating. 
Because the different theories cannot be applied in a realistic setting 
due to restrictions imposed on the models used, the only solution 
method  that remains is the formulation of a heuristic rule for buffer 
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simulate its functioning, and check whether the requirements (1) 
and (2) are met. 
The objective of this article is to see if one of the most flexible 
agreements so far (the 1986 cocoa agreement) meets the require- 
ments, and if not, in what way the buffer stock agreement can be 
improved. (Because of the similarity between the 1986 cocoa and 
the  1987 rubber agreement, we restrict our empirical analysis to 
the 1986 cocoa agreement.) The 1986 cocoa agreement is a mixture 
of both types of stabilization policies mentioned before. The price 
range is a  +_ 40-cent (U.S.) band around a reference price, and there 
are two instruments to keep the price within this range. There are 
also two instruments to adjust the reference or target price. The 
questions we want to answer here are, do these instruments enable 
the buffer stock manager to reduce the variance of the cocoa price 
under all market conditions, and is it possible to formulate a better 
rule for stabilizing prices? 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 
2 we will briefly discuss the features of the 1986 cocoa agreement. 
In Section 3  an annual model of the cocoa market and its main 
features are presented. In Section 4 the 1986 cocoa agreement is 
simulated and the instruments are tuned. In Section 5 the model 
is used to formulate some heuristic rules for market intervention, 
which are then compared with the agreement. The final section 
contains conclusions. 
2.  THE NEW STYLE COMMODITY AGREEMENTS 
This year the supply-demand balance for cocoa might move into 
deficit for the first time since 1984. The reason for this is that cocoa 
prices are low due to sustained excess production and large stocks. 
As a result, production is no longer increasing, whereas consump- 
tion does (although to a lesser extent than previously expected due 
to the unfavorable economic situation in the former Soviet Union 
and Eastern Europe). If this change in market conditions will pro- 
long over a longer period of time, the export earnings of the cocoa 
producing countries will improve. However, this improvement would 
not be the result the  1986 cocoa agreement; the agreement was 
never  fully utilized  due to  a  dispute over the use  of one of its 
instruments (withholding) between producing and consuming coun- 
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On the occasion of its adoption in July 1986,  Kenneth Dadzie, 
Secretary General of UNCTAD, described the International Cocoa 
Agreement as "the first of a new generation of International Com- 
modity Agreements" (ICA) (UNCTAD,  1986a). The justification 
for such a bold statement is that, for the first time in history, the 
objective of an ICA was exclusively geared towards the reduction of 
price fluctuations around the long-term market-determined trend. 
Stabilization of prices (and as a consequence export earnings) was 
the sole objective of this agreement (see Article 1 of the 1986 cocoa 
agreement (UNCTAD,  1986b)). 
The cocoa agreements of 1972 and 1975 were not effective at all 
because the cocoa price never was within the agreed price range. 
The agreement of  1980  only had  a  minor impact,  although the 
buffer stock manager bought 100,000 metric tons in the 1981/82 
season. The main reason for the ineffectiveness of the agreements 
was that they did not contain provisions for (semi)automatic revi- 
sions of the price range whenever necessary. The rubber agreement 
of 1979 was the first commodity agreement with a semiautomatic 
adjustment of the range, partly related to changes in the size of 
the buffer stock. In the 1987 Rubber Agreement, the mechanism 
of semiautomatic adjustment  of the price range is strengthened 
considerably also. For a comprehensive discussion on the function- 
ing of international commodity agreements, see Gilbert (1987). 
The decisive factor in shaping the character of the latest cocoa 
and rubber agreements was the collapse of the tin agreement in 
1985, due to prolonged attempts to maintain the tin prices at an 
artificially high level. As a direct consequence of this failure, the 
UNCTAD Committee on Commodities decided on new guidelines 
for commodity agreements. The major point of these guidelines 
was that future agreements should be designed in such a way that 
they stabilize prices without distorting long-term market trends, in 
the interests of producers and consumers (UNCTAD,  1986a). 
The 1986 cocoa agreement is characterized by a relatively wide 
price range, two stabilization instruments,  and a  high degree of 
price flexibility (UNCTAD,  1986b).  In the agreement the upper 
and lower intervention prices ("must sell" and "must buy" prices) 
are set at a  distance of 40 U.S. cents from the reference price of 
227 U.S. cents per kilo (SDR 1.935 at the time of adoption of the 
agreement). This means a range of _+ 17.6 percent from the refer- 
ence price, which is smaller than the + 20-percent range in the 1979 
rubber agreement (UNCTAD, 1980), but wider than the range of 
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The principal instrument in the 1986 cocoa agreement is a buffer 
stock of 250,000 metric tons.  The stock resulting from the 1980 
agreement (100,000 MT), and a  capital of U.S. $250 million were 
transferred to the new agreement. Additional funds for buffer stock 
operations continue to come from a levy of 2 U.S. cents per pound. 
The buffer stock manager has some freedom with respect to selling 
and buying, through the introduction of a  "may buy" and "may 
sell" prices at  ± 14.5 percent of the reference price. 
An interesting feature in the  1986 agreement is a  withholding 
scheme (equivalent to the contingency buffer stock in the 1987 rub- 
ber agreement (UNCTAD,  1987)). This is essentially a  system of 
national stocks (kept in store by the buffer stock manager) up to 
a  maximum of  120,000  metric tons.  The  scheme was  meant to 
become operative (in tranches of 30,000 MT) once the buffer had 
reached 200,000 metric tons,  or the manager would run out of 
funds. However, the Cocoa Council can (and did in 1988) decide 
against the use of the scheme by special vote. The impact of with- 
holding is the same as buying by the buffer stock manager. How- 
ever, there is a significant difference in the unloading of these two 
types of stocks. Stocks from the buffer are sold whenever the price 
reaches the upper intervention level. Withholdings are already re- 
leased at the reference price; so, only the lower half of the price 
range is relevant for this instrument. 
The most important new feature of the 1986 cocoa agreement 
is the flexibility of the price range due to two types of semiautomatic 
adjustment of the intervention prices. The first type relates to an 
annualprice review. In case the average indicator price over the preced- 
ing year has been outside the range, the intervention price is increased 
(decreased) to such an extent that the indicator price will come at a 
distance of 6  U.S.  cents  from the intervention price within the 
range. The maximum adjustment is set at  13 U.S. cents per kilo, 
unless the Cocoa Council decides otherwise by special vote. 
The second type of semiautomatic adjustment is triggered by a 
change in the size of the actually held buffer stock of 75, 000 metric 
tons within a six-month period. In that case the adjustment of the 
intervention price is 13 U.S. cents per kilo. Taking both semiauto- 
matic adjustments into account the 1986 cocoa agreement contains 
the most flexible adjustment of the price range that had ever been 
incorporated in a commodity agreement. 
A not unimportant novelty of the 1986 agreement is that all prices 
are expressed in SDRs. Using the SDR as a  denominator instead 
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are less distorted by changes of the dollar vis-/t-vis the major other 
currencies in the world. A substantial appreciation or depreciation 
of the dollar influences the nominal cocoa prices expressed in dol- 
lars. By using the SDR as a denominator, price changes are miti- 
gated. Theoretically one should use a basket of the currencies of 
all major consumer countries, with weights for the currencies ac- 
cording to their shares in cocoa consumption; also see Yeats (1987). 
However, the SDR is an acceptable substitute as unit of account. 
3.  A  MODEL OF THE COCOA MARKET 
Next we formulate a model for the cocoa market. Cocoa beans 
are produced in (often very poor) developing countries, and cocoa 
products are mainly consumed in developed countries. This dichot- 
omy is used to model the world cocoa market, with producers and 
consumers interpreted as countries or regions. Regions are arranged 
in such a way that the amount of beans imported by a cocoa-produc- 
ing region and the amount of beans exported by a consuming  region 
can be neglected.  1 Suan Tan (1984) reviews the theory underlying 
the construction of this type of model. 
The producing countries or regions are Cameroon, Ghana, Nigeria, 
Ivory Coast, the rest of Africa, Brazil, the rest of South America, 
and Asia and Oceania. The (normal) production of cocoa beans, 
QR, is based on two factors:  the area planted and the (average) 
production per acre. In contrast to Akiyama and Duncan (1982), 
who introduce two different relations, one for acreage and one for 
yields, only one relation  for the production of cocoa beans per 
country or region is introduced in our model. The reason for this 
is that the data for acreage are unreliable (FAO,  1985).  Besides, 
under fairly realistic assumptions it is not necessary to introduce 
two relations (Bateman 1965; Ady 1968). The decision on acreage 
and production is based on the development (or expectations) of 
long-term real producer prices, PFI/PC, as an indicator for profit 
expectations. This leads to the specification 
Instead of cocoa beans, bean equivalents are used to avoid the need for separate markets 
for intermediary products, such as cocoa butter, cocoa cake, and cocoa powder, etc. The 
Cocoa Council conversion  factors were used to achieve  this. Most data originate from FAO's 
Cocoa Statistics;  Gill and Duffus's Cocoa Market Reports; and the ICCO's Quarterly Bulletin 
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8  .  [PFIt-p~ 
Ain(QR,)  = 6o +  E[~p+tm|%x-A----) + ~dntQR,-,).  (1) 
p=O  \rUt-p~ 
Note that our specification can be interpreted as a reduced form 
formulation also (Kalaltzandonakes and Shonkwiler, 19~2). 
The consuming regions are North America, Western Europe, 
Eastern Europe (including the former Soviet Union), and the rest 
of the developed world.  As  a  measure for  cocoa consumption, 
grindings are used, adding the imports of powder, paste, and butter 
converted into bean equivalents. (In this way we cover the change 
in imports from beans to intermediary products also, especially in 
the trade between North America and Brazil.) Cocoa consumption 
per capita,  CC/POP,  is based  on real gross per capita income, 
GNPR/POP,  and real cocoa prices. The real import price, PI/PC, 
is used to represent the real cocoa price. The real price of sugar, 
PS/PC,  is introduced to account for possible substitution or com- 
plementary products. The specification used is 
In{ CC, ~  ,  IGNPRIPC,\  ,  i PI, \ 
/PS,\  ,  /  CC,_ ~ \  +  )  +  ).  (2) 
The price system for the different countries and regions contains 
relations for producer prices in home currency, PFI, and relations 
for export  and import  prices in U.S.  cents,  PE respectively PI. 
Note that the link between producer prices and export prices is the 
main link to signal market information to farmers. In some African 
countries this link is rather weak because of government interven- 
tion (Deaton,  1993).  The export and import prices are linked to 
the world market price for cocoa, PICCO. For all price equations 
an autoregressive distributed lag model of the first order is used. 
By restricting the parameters,  we tested what functional form is 
appropriate, that is, an error-correction mechanism, adaptive ex- 
pectations, and so forth. The resulting specifications are 
PElt =  KtPEtREt +  K2PEt-IREt-j  +  K3PFIt-I  (3) 
PEt =  KIPICCOt +  K2-1;)ICCOt-I  +  KaPEt-I  (4) 
Pit =  w.IPICCOt + K2PICCOt-I + w.3Plt-i.  (5) 
Total supply, QR WT, is the sum of production per country or 
region, and total demand, CCWT, is the sum of demand for grind- 
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includes a  small autonomous component, CCRR, to account for 
imports in countries or  regions that  are not modeled explicitly. 
Differences in supply and demand will also induce changes in free 
stocks, STWT, in the calculation of which we account for 1-percent 
transportation losses. 
8 
QR WTt  =  ~  QR.  total supply (6) 
i=l 
4 
CCWTt  =  ~.dCCtj  -[-  CCRRt  total demand  (7) 
j=l 
STWTI  =  STWTt-j  +  (0.99 QRWTt  -  CCWTt) 
total stocks  (8) 
The world market price for cocoa, PICCO, depends on the differ- 
ence between world supply and demand. We assume that consum- 
ing regions keep a fraction of their demand for grindings in stock 
to assure uninterrupted production of cocoa products. This desired 
level of stock is set equal to the average level of stocks over the 
past, which is 30 percent of total demand CCWT. In as far as last 
year's stocks differ from the desired level, this difference will have 
a negative effect on the price for cocoa. In a situation of changing 
demand, this will also induce a  change in the demand for stocks 
by 0.30ACCWT, which has to be added to the demand for con- 
sumption CCWTin order to obtain total demand. Because markets 
are not independent the commodity price index, CPI, is included 
to  account for  spillover effects from other  markets.  (Indicators 
for the instability of monetary variables did not have a significant 
influence in the estimation results.) The relation for PICCO is 
ln(PlCCOt)  =  ao +  oqln(CPI,) 
_  ¢tQRWTt  -  (CCWTI  +  0.30ACCWTt) 
CC WTt - 1 
STWTt-  1 -  0.30CCWTt-  1 
-  t13  +  tt41n(PICCOt-O.  (9) 
CC WT,_  l 
Note that we use price information instead of a market-clearing 
identity to achieve long-term equilibrium. 
The model also includes a  submodel for the calculation of the 
opportunity costs and operational result of buffer stock operations. 
The opportunity costs are based on the cash-flow from buying and 
selling cocoa beans by the buffer stock manager, minus the interest 
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the costs of keeping the beans in a warehouse in the United Kingdom 
(storage, insurance, rotation). The interest accounted for is based 
on a  real interest rate of 5 percent per year. The estimated costs 
of keeping 1,000 metric tons of cocoa beans in stock are based on 
information gathered by UNCTAD (UNCTAD, 1975), and private 
correspondence with the ICCO. The costs are indexed on Manufac- 
turers Unit Value index, MUV. The operational result is equal to 
the opportunity costs without the annual loan to finance the buffer, 
but including the interest gained  from the surplus funds of the 
ICCO. These surplus funds are what remains of the contributions- 
2  U.S.  cents per pound-after  the buffer stock operations.  The 
operational result is of special interest to the members of the ICCO, 
because it indicates to what extent the buffer operations need extra 
finance apart from the arrangements already made. 
3A.  Implementation of the Agreement in the Model 
The two buffer stock instruments and two adjustment mecha- 
nisms for the price range (see Section 2) have to be translated into 
terms of the model. Because the model is based on annual data, 
our interpretation of the instruments in the agreement will deviate 
somewhat from their exact content. 
The buffer stock can be implemented easily in equations 8 and 
9. This is not the case for adjustment of the reference price by 13 
U.S. cents per kilo if the buffer stock manager has to sell or buy 
75,000 metric tons within six months. In the model this is translated 
into an adjustment of reference price each time the buffer stock 
manager sells (buys) 75,000 tons within one year, with a maximum 
of two adjustments per year. After one adjustment within a period, 
the simulation is restarted using the adjusted intervention price. 
No use is made of the "may sell" and "may buy" option. 
Withholding has the same effect on prices as a buffer stock muta- 
tion. In the model withholding starts, up to a maximum of 120,000 
metric tons and without employing tranches, when the maximum 
buffer of 250,000 metric tons is reached.  Withholdings are  sold 
whenever the actual cocoa price exceeds the reference price. The 
amount sold will keep the actual price equal to the reference price. 
Implementation of the annual price review is straightforward. 
The intervention prices are adjusted each calendar year instead of 
each cocoa year. 
Instead of all the detailed information on the estimation results, 
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Table 1:  Price Elasticities  of Cocoa Production 
Country or region  Short run*  Long runt 
Cameroon  0.13  0.73 
Ghana  0.10  0.38 
Ivory Coast  0.42  0.82 
Nigeria  0.20  0.47 
Brazil  0.25  0.29 
Rest of Latin America  0.14  0.28 
Asia and Oceania  0.00  0.50 
World total  0.23  0.54 
* Short run means current and one-year lag. 
t Long run means steady state elasticity. 
Note:  For the region Rest of Africa,  we used a  dummy equation that  describes the 
development of production over time. 
and consumption, and the effect of a change in real gross national 
income per capita are reported. These effects are given in Tables 
1 and Table 2, respectively. Compared to other studies (Akiyama 
and Duncan,  1982;  ICCO,  1984),  the results for North America 
and Western Europe are of the same magnitude. For Eastern Eu- 
rope and the Soviet Union, the price elasticities obtained differ. 
This is partially due to differences in the definition of the regions. 
With respect to the rest of the developed world, the results are close 
to those obtained by the ICCO, but differ from the results of Akiyama 
and Duncan. There are, however, no real anomalies between the vari- 
ous results on elasticities, only differences in magnitude. 
The short-run price elasticities of production and consumption 
are quite low (see Tables 1 and 2). The short-run elasticity of pro- 
duction for the world is 50 percent higher than the corresponding 
Table 2:  Price and Income Elasticities of Cocoa Consumption 
Price  Income 
Area  Short run  Long run  Short run  Long run 
North America  -  0.19  -  0.25  0.21  0.25 
Western Europe  -  0.11  -  0.15  0.25  0.30 
Eastern Europe and Soviet Union  -0.14  -0.26  0.44  0.66 
Rest of world  -  0.26  -  0.40  0.42  0.57 
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elasticity of consumption. The difference in magnitude increases 
over time. This is due to the fact that in the short-run producers 
can only react on prices by taking better care of the existing stock 
of trees. In the long-run, the stock of trees can be adjusted also. 
The income elasticities, both in the short-run and the long-run, 
are low in North America and Europe, which points at saturation 
of the market. In Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, and 
the rest of the developed world income elasticities are considerably 
higher. 
4.  SIMULATING  THE 1986 COCOA AGREEMENT 
In order to  test the strength and weakness of the  1986 cocoa 
agreement, a number of simulation experiments are performed over 
a period of 25 years (for the sake of simplicity identified with the 
period  1994-2018).  Because exchange rates  are  exogenous, it  is 
assumed that they are constant over the simulation period. The 
development in consumption prices in the different countries and 
regions are linked to the development  in the commodity  price index, 
CPI; this to avoid unnecessary compfications as a  consequence of 
large differences in the long-term development of exogenous vari- 
ables. The free simulation of the model performed reasonably well 
(measured in Theil's inequality coefficient) over the estimation pe- 
riod. 
To introduce deviations from the model's trend we use trace- 
driven simulation (Kleijnen and Van Groenendaal, 1992). We calcu- 
lated the trend in the univariate production models over the past, 
and took the difference between this trend and the actual values 
as  disturbances.  For CPI we calculated the deviations from the 
geometrical trend. The deviations obtained were fed in historical 
order into the model. In the remainder of this section we will exam- 
ine the effect of the agreement (and the different instruments avail- 
able)  on the variability in the international cocoa price and  on 
the variability in income.  2 In what follows, the policy results are 
compared with the result of a  free simulation. 
2As a  yardstick for the variability the following instability index is used: 
x~ -  xo(l  +  x)q  2 ~ 
rI= 
Xmelm 
with ~  =  0 and an appropriate xo equal to the coefficient of variation. For a general discussion 
on instability indices, see Offutt and Blandford (1986). CAN INTERNATIONAL COMMODITY AGREEMENTS WORK?  269 
In case of zero growth in CPI, the agreement does not affect the 
world production and consumption of cocoa beans  (on average 
-  1,800 MT and  -  1,600 MT, respectively, on an average annual 
world production of approximately 1.9 million MT). There is no 
change in the market shares of the different countries and regions, 
which implies that the agreement is neutral with respect to produc- 
tion and consumption. On average, income and spending are slightly 
lower compared to the free simulation, due to a  small decline of 
the cocoa price (-1.4  U.S.  cent per kilo). This implies that the 
agreement is neutral with respect to the nominal variables  also. 
With an average buffer stock of  178,200 metric tons,  the buffer 
stock policy of the agreement seems self-liquidating and in line 
with the 1986 UNCTAD guidelines as reviewed in Section 2. 
Because of the intervention, the instability index of cocoa prices 
reduces from 36.9 percent (free simulation) to 26.8 percent (see 
Table 3), a reduction of more than 25 percent. As a corollary, the 
amplitude of the price range is reduced considerably: the highest 
price over the 25-year period decreases from 282 to 263 U.S. cents 
per kilo, and the lowest price increases from 161 to 171 U.S. cents 
per kilo.  The lowest price instability index attainable within the 
agreement price range of ___ 40 U.S. cents is 19.3 percent, based on 
an unlimited buffer,  so the degree of price stabilization reached 
(26.8°70) is quite satisfactory.  These positive results are obtained 
despite a  really drastic shock in the fifth year of the simulation, 
comparable to the one in  1965, when world production of cocoa 
beans increases over 30 percent. 
The stabilization of export earnings is less significant. The overall 
index decreases from 20.1 percent to 17.5 percent, the two largest 
producers (Brazil and Ivory Coast) gaining the most in terms of 
stabilization of export earnings. Note that all individual producing 
countries gain from the agreement in terms of stabilization of export 
earnings. 
This result is achieved with a  limited number of interventions. 
The buffer stock manager, starting with a stock of 100,000 metric 
tons, buys stocks only once,  150,000 metric tons in  1998,  which 
implies an adjustment of the price range by two times 13 U.S. cents. 
The price range which was  187-267 U.S.  cents at the beginning, 
becomes  161-241  U.S.  cents,  and  the buffer is  at  its  maximum 
level for two consecutive years. The buffer stock manager uses the 
instrument of withholding only in 2005 (64,400 MT) in order to 
keep the price range constant. In the following two years 39,600 
metric tons and 25,000 metric tons are sold, because in these years 270  W.J.H.  Van Groenendaal and J. W.  A.  Vingerhoets 




Simulation  Agreement  decrease 
Prices 
PICCO  36.9070  26.8070  27.3 070 
PICCO/CPIG  29.1 07o  24.3 070  16.7 070 
Earnings 
Brazil  20.4070  16.507o  18.907o 
Rest of Latin America  24.5070  21.207o  13.4o/o 
Cameroon  27.2070  23.307o  14.307o 
Ghana  47.7070  41.607o  12.907o 
Ivory Coast  21.507o  17.607o  17.907o 
Nigeria  53.007o  47.6%  10.1 070 
Rest of Africa  30.907o  27.4070  11.4070 
Asia and Oceania  9.407o  8.107o  13.707o 
Total  20.1%  17.507o  12.907o 
the price of cocoa beans becomes larger than the reference price 
of 201 U.S. cents. The price range remains constant until the year 
2016.  To keep it constant, the buffer stock manager sells 93,400 
metric tons in the period from 2010 to 2013 without triggering an 
adjustment mechanism. In the year 2008, a total of 75,000 metric 
tons are sold and the price range becomes 174-254 U.S. cents. In 
2017 the remainder of the buffer is sold, which implies a new price 
range resulting from the fact that more than 75,000 metric tons 
are sold. However, in that year the price range is also adjusted as 
a  result of the fact that the price of cocoa beans lies outside the 
range at the end of the year; consequently the price range becomes 
200-280 U.S. cents in the year 2018. 
It turns out that the  1986 agreement is easily self-supporting. 
The operational result is on average U.S. $90 million a year. The 
opportunity costs of the buffer stock operations are on average U.S. 
$22.7 million a year, which is a rather low price for the stabilization 
achieved; it is only 0.5 percent of the average value of production. 
These figures are based on the assumption that the existing 1985 
stock of 100,000 metric tons was bought at  1985 prices. 
The difference in export earnings between the free simulation 
and the agreement policy is slightly negative and on average minus 
U.S. $34 million or  -0.007 percent of average annual earnings. CAN  INTERNATIONAL  COMMODITY  AGREEMENTS  WORK?  271 
Table 4:  The Simulation Results 
Result 
Policy 
Instability  Instability  Operational  Opportunity 
index  index export  result  costs 
prices  earnings  (million U.S.$)  (million U.S.$) 
Zero-percent  inflation 
Free simulation  36.9%  20.1%  --  -- 
Agreement  26.8%  17.5%  92.1  22.7 
Maximum buffer  19.3 %  12.6%  60.4  117.1 
Less flexible  21.7%  14.4%  54.5  31.5 
+ 30 U.S.  cents  24.5%  18.4%  92.4  22.3 
+20 U.S.  cents  20.9%  16.4%  101.8  12.9 
+  10 U.S.  cents  20.1%  15.4%  89.5  25.3 
Internal  growth (5%)  16.6%  15.4%  102.6  11.9 
One-percent inflation 
Free simulation  37.9%  19.8%  -  - 
Agreement  28.7%  18.9%  138.8  14.7 
+ 20 U.S.  cents  24.2%  18.7%  160.5  -  7.1 
Internal growth (5%)  16.0%  15.5%  136.6  16.1 
Three-percent  inflation 
Free simulation  38.1%  19.1%  --  -- 
Agreement  29.4%  18.2%  294.7  -  39.4 
+ 20 U.S.  cents  23.0%  18.2%  291.9  -  36.5 
Internal  growth (5%)  18.6%  16.9%  211.5  40.2 
4A.  Variations on the Agreement Policy 
Several factors indicate that the functioning of the 1986 agreement 
can be improved upon. First, the buffer stock is not very active (6 
out of 25 periods).  Second, the withholding instrument is hardly 
used.  Third, the mechanism of adjustment of the price range at 
the end of the calendar year is used only once. All this means that 
the flexibility (13 U.S. cents) triggered by changes of 75,000 metric 
tons in the size of the buffer stock, and activated four times under 
the agreement policy, is too high given the price range of + 40 U.S. 
cents. There are two ways in which this flexibility can be reduced, 
by smaller adjustments of the reference price, and by reducing the 
price range. 
First, the flexibility is reduced by 50 percent (from 13 U.S. cents 
to 6.5  U.S.  cents per kilo).  This results  in a  better  performance 
(see Table 4, "less flexible"). This better result is attained at limited 
additional opportunity costs (U.S. $9 million per year). The insta- 
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for income to 14.4 percent. Both values are close to the minimum 
values that can be attained by a maximum buffer (Table 4, "maxi- 
mum buffer"). As under the agreement, this alternative policy stabi- 
lizes the income of every individual country/region and has hardly 
any influence on total income, production, consumption, and aver- 
age cocoa prices. Also in this case the buffer seems self-liquidating. 
The very positive outcome of this variation on the agreement is 
not due to the fact that the buffer is more active. Rather, this case 
demonstrates the possible effect of the withholding scheme. This 
scheme is active in 12 out of the 25 years. However, it functions 
only in the lower half of the price range.  Therefore, during this 
period, the prices are in fact kept within a  range of 40 U.S. cents 
under the reference price. 
Further sensitivity analysis of the 75,000-metric ton price adjust- 
ment showed that the result could not be improved upon. There 
is also a good balance between flexibility and size of the instruments. 
Increasing the maximum buffer stock and/or the maximum with- 
holdings does not lead to better results. 
An alternative for a reduction of flexibility is a narrowing of the 
price range. The most significant result was reached after reducing 
the range to  _+ 20 U.S. cents. The result of this reduction is almost 
equal to the result of the variation on the agreement with reduced 
flexibility (see Table 4, 0°1o inflation and + 20 U.S. cents). The only, 
but important, difference is that the costs of stabilization are much 
lower, amounting to less than U.S. $12.9 million per year, and the 
operational result nearly doubles. Further reduction of the price 
range leads to a slightly better result, but at the expense of doubling 
the real costs of the agreement. This is in line with the theoretical 
result that narrowing the band too much increases the costs. (Tur- 
novsky, 1978, and Newberry and Stiglitz, 1982, emphasize that in 
a theoretical setting, perfect price stability is either not feasible or 
infinitely costly.) 
The results  of a  policy with a  price range of  +_ 20 U.S.  cents 
cannot be improved upon by changes in the mix of instruments. 
The result does not depend on an active withholding mechanism. 
The buffer is very active and-at  least as important-the price ad- 
justment mechanism becomes operational quite frequently. As with 
the other variations discussed, the policy is neutral with respect to 
the long-run market trend. 
4B.  The Agreement in an Inflationary World 
Until now the operation of the agreement has been analyzed in 
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of the 1986 agreement become ineffective after a number of years. 
In case of an annual increase in the trend of the commodity price 
index, CPI, of 1 percent per year, the buffer manager buys 130,000 
metric tons in 1998, which keeps the price within the range for a 
total period of 12 years. Then inflation catches up with the price 
range. The price range is gradually increased in the following years, 
and the buffer is empty within two years (after the 12th year). The 
buffer remains empty and becomes ineffective.  This  implies that 
the agreement is not neutral with respect to spillover effects from 
other markets. Because of the operations of the buffer stock, the 
price instability index still declines from 37.9 percent to 28.7 per- 
cent, but earnings are only marginally stabilized (see Table 4). 
In case the rate of inflation doubles or triples, the period after 
which the agreement becomes ineffective is 10 and 7 years, respec- 
tively. So the higher the rate of inflation, the sooner the agreement 
becomes ineffective. The stabilizing effect is therefore less, even if 
we apply the optimal mix of instruments established above (Table 
4,  _+ 20 U.S.  cents). These findings throw some light on how the 
agreement would have functioned in the past. In the 1960s up to 
1972,  with a  trend growth in CPI of 1.3 percent, the agreement 
could have functioned to a limited extent. In the period 1972-1982, 
however, with a trend growth of almost 7 percent, the agreement 
would have been totally ineffective, as confirmed by experiments 
over the past.  The results indicate that even a  moderate rate  of 
inflation paralyzes the functioning of the agreement, Consequently, 
given the structure of the agreement, it will be necessary to renegoti- 
ate the price range regularly. With 1-percent inflation, renegotiation 
is necessary every 5  years,  and in case of 3 percent inflation, at 
least every 3  years.  The question is,  can these renegotiations be 
avoided? 
5.  A  HEURISTIC RULE FOR INTERVENTION 
The policy implicit in the goals of an agreement can be formulated 
as a  simple closed-loop buffer stock rule of the form 
A(BSTt)  = f,(PICCOt, PICCO*)  (10) 
PICCOt*  = gl(PICCOt- l, A(BSTt_ 1), CP~). 
where PICCO* is the target price; A(BSTt), the change in the buffer 
stock;  and CPFt, the expected commodity price index.  This ap- 
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the practical constraints the buffer stock manager has to deal with. 
A disadvantage is that it is not possible to prove that such an agreement 
leads to optimal results; it can only be shown that over a longer 
period of time it is satisfying. 
In order to do this we translate the principle, that a decision rule 
should adjust for fluctuations in supply and demand in such a way 
that it does not effect the price trend induced by structural changes 
in supply and/or demand, into variables of the model. To reduce 
the variance of the price, two conditions have to be met (see Equa- 
tion 9): 
QRWTt-  (CCWTt +  0.30A(CCWT,))  =  A(BST1,),  (11) 
STWTt_ ~ -  0.30CCWTt_ ~ =  A(BST2t).  (12) 
Equation 11 implies short-term market equilibrium, whereas equa- 
tions 11 and 12 together imply long-term market equilibrium, be- 
cause stocks are kept at their desired level also. Note that if QR WTt 
increases with time and CCWTt stays constant, the positive effect 
of A(BSTlt)  is offset by a negative A(BS72t) one year later. There- 
fore the buffer stock is self-liquidating in the long term. The total 
buffer stock mutation necessary to achieve the desired target of 
long-term market equilibrium is 
A(BSTt) =  A(BSTlt)  +  A(BST2t).  (13) 
This condition is the target for the buffer stock manager. Implemen- 
tation in Equation (9) leads to a  pragmatic target price which is 
recalculated every period 
PICCO?  =  exp [ ao  +  alln( CPIf)  +  aJn(PICCO,- i) }.  (14) 
Since the adjustment A(BSTt) is based on market conditions of the 
market for cocoa beans  only, this rule for evaluating the target 
price from year to year is called the rule of "internal growth." 
5A.  Application of the Rule of Internal Growth 
If the buffer stock manager bases his policy on Equations 13 and 
14,  long-term market equilibrium is achieved. In order to apply 
this rule, it is assumed that the expected commodity price index, 
CP1  e, is equal to the actual commodity price index, CPI. It turns out 
that in terms of variability reduction the rule of "internal growth" is 
superior to the agreement under all circumstances, even if we use 
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A band of _+ 5 percent around PICCOt is used before the policy 
is activated. This for practical reasons, not every minor difference 
in demand and supply has to be taken into account; only larger 
fluctuations are of interest. A smaller band also increases again the 
costs; a larger band has a less-stabilizing effect. Note that earnings 
too are stabilized to a greater extent; only the optimal agreement 
policy, in case there is no inflation, achieves the same stabilizing 
effect. Moreover, in the case of zero growth, the opportunity costs 
of this policy are lower, U.S. $11.9 million instead of U.S. $22.7 
million. The maximum buffer is 338,800 metric tons; this maximum 
buffer is less than 40 percent of the size of the maximum buffer 
under the agreement with no restriction on the size of the buffer. 
The minimum buffer is zero metric ton, and as a result the policy 
is ineffective three times in the first half of the simulation period. 
The average buffer is 131,500 metric tons, so the policy is self-liqui- 
dating. 
If we apply the rule of internal growth, but restrict the buffer 
size to 250,000 metric tons and allow for withholding, the policy still 
works. The results remain almost the same as with no restrictions on 
the buffer, which is logical because the maximum buffer required 
is less than the sum of the maximum buffer and maximum withhold- 
ings. The difference in average annual export earnings between the 
free simulation and our policy is minus U.S. $17 million only, or 
0.0035 percent of average earnings. 
In  an inflationary world,  the results  under  a  rule of internal 
growth do not deteriorate; stabilization is reached, although at a 
certain  price  (see  Table  4).  This  is  in  sharp  contrast  with  the 
agreement, which becomes ineffective after a  limited number of 
years.  Our rule of internal growth is neutral with respect to the 
long-term trend of the world cocoa market and does not go against 
the trend in CPI. Neither production nor consumption or stocks 
are significantly influenced by this stabilization policy. 
6.  CONCLUSIONS 
The semiautomatic price adjustment mechanism and the two 
intervention instruments of the 1986 cocoa agreement augur well 
for its success if it would have been applied. Our analysis shows 
that the instruments in the agreement can have a substantial stabiliz- 
ing effect on prices  and export earnings.  The operational result 
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additional funding would have been required to finance the buffer 
stock operations.  The opportunity costs are  also relatively low. 
Our analysis indicates, moreover, that the effectiveness of the in- 
struments can considerably be enhanced by halving the width of the 
price range. An essential precondition for success of an agreement 
based on the same type of instruments is, however, that its potential 
flexibility is fully utilized. The dispute over price adjustment and 
withholdings that arose in the spring of 1988 between producers 
and consumers is, therefore, most unfortunate. 
However, even only moderate inflation of world commodity prices 
will make the agreement ineffective after a some time. (The same 
conclusion holds for deflation.) Consequently, periodical and most 
likely cumbersome renegotiations of the price range are necessary. 
As  the  past  has  shown,  such  renegotiations,  which  are  always 
needed when market conditions are unfavorable for either consum- 
ers or products, paralyze an agreement. 
The functioning of agreements can be improved by the applica- 
tion of our rule of internal growth, which is neutral with respect 
to spiUover effects from other markets but neutralizes the market's 
own disturbances.  Price stabilization can be reached to a  higher 
degree, and periodical renegotiation of the price range or the refer- 
ence price would no longer be necessary. 
The rule requires less information on future prices than an optimal- 
control or difference-game solution does. Compared with former 
price-range rules, our fast adaption of the reference price avoids 
buffer stock operations based on changes in the price trend that 
cannot be altered. 
Our analysis shows that stabilization of prices and, to a  lesser 
extent, of export earnings can be achieved at moderate costs and 
with limited interventions. This is  opposite to previous findings 
(Lee and Blandford,  1980). 
We also found that there is no substantial difference in export 
earnings between the cocoa agreement policy, our own policy rule, 
and the free simulation. This is in line with the results of Ghosh 
et al. (1982, 1987), and Hughes Hallett (1986), but in sharp contrast 
with the familiar Waugh-Oi-Massell results. 
Application of the rule of internal growth requires information 
on development and effect of other markets on the cocoa market 
for the current period.  In our model this means that the buffer 
manager needs a good indicator for the development of commodity 
price index,  CPI.  Further research  on the exact  relation  within 
commodity markets and between commodity markets and other CAN INTERNATIONAL  COMMODITY AGREEMENTS WORK?  277 
markets is  needed first.  We used an annual model for the cocoa 
market to test our policy.  More realistic models,  however,  are re- 
quired before our tests can be applied. 
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